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Electricity courses through our lives. Yet, there are still more than a billion people worldwide who 
are not connected to the grid, and many more get abysmal supply, unlike the 24/7/365 flow that 
rich countries take for granted. We argue that these shortfalls are due to a sad irony: treating 
electricity as a right for the poor has limited electricity access. 
How does this noble social norm defeat itself? Consider a supply-side parable from the 
market for ice cream. You are the proprietor of a campus ice cream parlor—the only one, as the 
university has granted you an exclusive license. It is hot outside and the dorms lack AC, so you 
hope to sell a lot of cones and turn a nice profit. The University is concerned that everyone stays 
cool and decides to keep ice-cream prices low. You are told that although it costs $1 to produce an 
ice cream, you can only charge 91 cents for each. In return you receive 73 as a subsidy from the 
University, so that in theory you should be able to make 64 cents (=91+73-100) in profit on each 
sale.   
You soon run into trouble. Even with the best freezers, a small percentage of your ice cream 
melts on the drive from the creamery, bringing your average revenue per cone input down to 86 
cents. Students jump shipments and eat ice cream for free, sometimes even sharing a scoop with 
the University police. You lose 2 of every 5 shipments to theft or melting, bringing revenue down 
to 55 cents per ice cream. Your student cashiers keep “forgetting” to charge their friends the posted 
prices. For every five ice creams supplied at the parlor, three go uncharged, bringing your effective 
revenue down to 23 cents per cone. Thanks to rampant theft and nonpayment, you end up 
recouping barely a third of the cost of production. 
Because you only receive the 73 cent subsidy on ice cream that is sold, even with the 
university subsidy you take home just 41 cents per scoop against a $1 production cost. As a result, 
you are losing money and would very soon go out of business. However, by now students view 
ice creams as a necessity so the university, fearing student protests, decides to keep you afloat with 
occasional grants. You were grateful for the first grant but in bailing you out, the university only 
made things worse. The message to students is that ice-cream theft is not a big deal, indeed they 
have a right to free cones as part of the college experience. Having learned that protests not 
payment would get them ice cream, even fewer students bother to pay, and your revenues fall 
month-by-month.  
Since the grants keep you afloat, the university administration becomes your only real 
customer. You are losing money on every ice cream sold. Although you started out imagining how 
to sell as many ice creams as possible, you want to sell fewer now, and you phone the creamery to 
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cut back your orders to the bare minimum needed to meet the terms of your license. Long lines 
build up outside your parlor, with some students rejoicing at the occasional free cones and many 
others left wishing they could just buy ice-cream at the price where you could turn a profit. You 
decide that this is clearly not the profitable business you had hoped it would be and cancel your 
planned expansion. 
The ice cream parable is the true story of electricity distribution companies across the 
developing world. The numbers from the ice cream store are proportional to the real prices and 
costs of electricity in Bihar, an Indian state of 100 million people (see Figure 1, replacing cones of 
ice cream with kilowatt-hours (kWh) of power). We argue that the social norm that electricity is a 
right generates losses, rationing and unmet demand for electricity, just as it does in our parable 
about ice cream. By “electricity as a right”, we specifically refer to the social norm that all deserve 
power regardless of payment.  
 
Figure 1 
Electricity Losses in Bihar, India 
 
 
Source: Bihar Electricity Project feeder data; Indian Ministry of Power; Bihar Electricity Regulatory Commission 
Notes: The dotted line is the average cost of supplying one kWh of electricity in Bihar, including raw power, labor, and fixed 
costs of grid operation. The solid line shows average revenue after cumulatively accounting for various sources of electricity loss.  
 
  Given that societies wish to redistribute towards the poor, and governments do so in many 
domains, such as health, education and housing, why should we exempt electricity? Are not all 
these goods essential to each individual’s development, and do they not therefore justify 
subsidized, public provision?  
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We argue that the interaction of the social norm that electricity is a right and a technological 
constraint makes the consequences of treating electricity as a right worse than for other private 
goods. The technological constraint is that it is costly to target electricity supply to particular (e.g., 
paying or poor) customers because almost everyone can (illegally) access the same electricity 
wires. The result is that electricity is not easily excludable. Social and political constraints make 
disconnecting consumers prohibitively costly, resulting in high levels of non-payment and theft. 
Just as in our ice cream analogy, the result of subsidies and a perceived right to service is 
that distribution companies incur huge losses. Although the budget constraints utilities face are 
often soft, because of government support or ownership, at some point they do start to bind. The 
utility then limits its losses by rationing supply. There is only one grid, and it becomes impossible 
to offer a higher quality of supply to those consumers who are willing, even desperate, to pay for 
it. Whole villages go dark and this is given technical terms like “load shedding” but at its core it 
reflects a decision by the utility to sell less. The non-payment social norm therefore implies that 
consumers cannot get all the electricity they are willing to pay for.  
Figure 2 describes an electric utility in this equilibrium. The graph also uses data from rural 
Bihar, India where we have access to extraordinary administrative data based on our work there 
for nearly a decade. Every point represents an electricity feeder, a disaggregated level of the grid 
that serves about 2,500 households and businesses. The horizontal axis shows the share of expected 
revenue from energy pumped into the grid that is actually collected by the distribution company. 
The expected revenue is based on published prices. The vertical axis shows the hours of supply 
that each feeder receives per day. 
The graph reveals three facts about how the retail electricity market works. First, supply is 
heavily rationed. In this sample of rural feeders, no consumer gets 24 hours of electricity; on 
average consumers receive about 12 hours a day, and some areas get only 6 hours a day. Second, 
payment rates are abysmal. Our revenue rate measure, the all-in ratio of revenue from customers 
over the value of energy injected, is smeared out along the horizontal axis. There is some mass of 
areas paying the full share of energy value, to the right, but more customers paying less than 0.20 
share, on the left. The average revenue rate is 35% and 75% of feeders pay less than 40% of the 
value of energy injection. Third, and perhaps most striking, the scatter plot shows no relationship 
between how much supply people receive and how much they pay for the electricity they use. The 
solid red line of best fit is basically flat, or perhaps even slightly negative! Areas that pay for the 
entire cost of power get no more power than areas that pay nothing. 
Think of how this graph would appear for power consumption in a developed country. 
Outage rates are extremely low so all areas would, to the eye, have exactly 24 hours of supply. 
Loss and payment rates are also low, so all areas would have a revenue rate of one. These scattered 
points would collapse to a single point in the northeast corner. In contrast, in Bihar the right to 
electricity, along with the high costs of targeting supply to select customers, has severed the link 
between payment and supply which underpins all markets for private goods.  
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Figure 2 
Hours of Electricity Provided in Bihar vs. Fraction of Revenue Collected 
 
Source: Bihar Electrification Project 
Notes: This figure shows the average hours of electricity supplied to different areas each day (vertical axis) against the share of the 
cost of electricity that each area pays (horizontal axis) for roughly 52 feeders in north Bihar in each of 5 months before 
implementation of the Revenue-Linked Supply Scheme. Both variables are observed in administrative data at the level of electricity 
feeders serving approximately 13,000 people on average. The share of cost is calculated as the total payments for electricity divided 
by the procurement cost of energy injected, and so ranges between zero and one, for areas that pay none or all of their bills, 
respectively. 
 
When public provision collapses in other domains, households often have good private 
substitutes. That cannot be the case for electricity. Electricity is a natural monopoly: average cost 
is decreasing for all quantities, so it is efficient to have one grid. Households do substitute, but 
they substitute to the equivalent of electricity autarky—off-grid diesel generators or solar panels 
that cost far more than grid electricity. 
In the equilibrium we describe there is a pent-up demand for electricity from consumers 
who are able and willing to pay for it. The rationing of electricity, on the intensive margin of hours 
of supply per day, is also mirrored by the rationing of grid investment and expansion, on the 
extensive margin of who gets connected to the grid. Nearly a billion people in the developing 
world remain without access to electricity; we believe that a chunk of this number is made up of 
people who are effectively rationed off the grid, since the norm that electricity is a right combined 
with non-excludability make it money-losing to connect them in the first place.  
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A review of the impacts of electricity on growth is beyond the scope of this paper, however 
there is substantial evidence that access to reliable electricity can increase business profits, firm 
entry, labor productivity, and other inputs to growth (Allcott, Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell 
2016, Dinkelman 2011, Kassem 2018, Fried and Lagakos 2017, Fried and Lagakos 2019). 
Electricity appears not only to boost output and labor supply in the short run but to raise long-run 
levels of productivity (Lipscomb et al 2013). Electricity is an essential input to production, 
consumption, communication and finance; there are no societies that have reached high living 
standards without consuming lots of energy. A well-intentioned “right to electricity” may therefore 
be a drag on economic development. 
 
I. A Kuznets Curve for Electricity 
 
Two energy worlds coexist, one where consumers enjoy universal access 24 hours a day 
and another where many consumers are not on the grid and those who are connected suffer 
irregular supply. Panel A of Table 1 shows the differences in these worlds through statistics on 
electricity use for countries by quartiles of world income.  
In some respects, the two energy worlds are only different in degree, in a way that may be 
taken as intrinsic to the differences in income levels between poor and rich countries. Electricity 
consumption in low income countries is a negligible 1% of that in the United States; inequality in 
electricity is larger than income inequality. All consumers in rich countries have electricity 
whereas only 35% do in the poorest quartile of countries. It is possible that these unconnected poor 
have low demand for electricity and it would lower social surplus to connect them to the grid (Lee, 
Miguel and Wolfram 2018). We present evidence that another reason for low access is due to 
electricity being treated as a right on the supply side of the market. 
Other differences between the energy worlds are differences in kind that do not seem 
intrinsic to income. For example, transmission and distribution (T&D) losses are about four times 
higher in the poorest quartile of countries as in the richest (22.8% versus 6.1%). The technologies 
used for distribution are largely the same everywhere; though the levels of investment or structure 
of the distribution network may be different, there is no way to justify a four-fold difference in 
losses on technical grounds alone.  
Poor countries also price power below cost. Table 1, Panel B shows that in the poorest 
quartile of countries utilities pay a mean power purchase cost of 6.4 cents per kWh and charge 
customers 3.6 cents per kWh for the same power. If we inflate power purchase costs by T&D 
losses, since utilities have to buy more input power to make up for the power they lose, then the 
input cost is 7.8 cents per kWh. Thus the average utility in a poor country makes 46 cents per 
dollar of input cost and this calculation excludes the non-energy variable costs of distribution and 
commercial losses from power billed but not paid for. Utilities in the second quartile of income 
also price power below cost (second column) but we do not see the same difference in rich 
countries (fourth column). At the top of the income distribution, the average price is roughly three 
times higher than the average power purchase cost (18.8 cents relative to 6.6 cents per kWh). 
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The last row of Table 1, which gives the difference between the average price the utility is 
paid and the average amount it must pay to generators, is therefore an upper bound on utility profit 
per kWh. The difference is negative for low and lower-middle income countries, suggesting that 
utilities in poorer countries do not cover the raw costs of power acquired from generators. Utilities 
in these income brackets are therefore unprofitable and must be supported by government subsidies 
and grants. Including commercial losses, power that is billed but not paid for, would further inflate 
these losses, as we have shown in Bihar.  
We say that these differences are not intrinsic to poverty because it is clearly possible that 
poorer countries would manage well-run grids, with limited subsidies, where electricity was not 
lost and people just used little due to low demand for electricity at low incomes. But that is not the 
case—people do use little, but losses are high. The average price shown in Panel B is also lower 
in these countries, in large part due to subsidies, further increasing the gap between costs and 
revenues. In poor countries, therefore, utilities lose money on every unit they sell. 
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Table 1 
Key Electricity Summary Statistics, by Income Level 
 
Quartile Lowest
Lower-
middle
Upper-
middle
Highest
Population (millions) 619 2,972 2,568 1,165
GDP per capita in 2016                           
(% of US)
2.9 10.7 26.7 79.8
Electricity consumption per capita          
(% of US)
1.1 5.9 27.2 69.9
Connection to Grid (%)                    34.9 83.6 99.4 100.0
T&D Loss (%) 22.8 16.2 9.6 6.1
Firm losses due to outages                         
(% of output)
8.7 6.6 2.1 1.6
Mean consumption of electrified 
households (kWh)
98 103 162 574
Mean price at mean consumption level 
(US cents/kWH)
3.6 6.3 7.6 18.8
Mean power purchase cost                    
(US cents/kWH)
6.4 7.2 6.6 6.2
Power purchase cost after T&D loss 
adjustment (US cents/kWH)
7.8 8.3 7.5 6.6
Mean price less adj. power purchase cost 
(US cents/kWH)
-4.2 -2.0 0.1 12.2
Source: World Bank, IEA, World Energy Council, country sources                                                                                                               
Notes: This table shows electricity variables for four income categories of countries, using the 2018 World Bank 
thresholds of 2016 GNI per capita of ($1,005; $3,955; $12,235). Panel A displays population-weighted averages for all 
countries in each income category. In Panel B the sample consists of the ten largest countries worldwide by population as 
well as the three most populous in each WB income category: Ethiopia, DR Congo, and Tanzania (lowest); Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines (lower-middle); Brazil, China, Mexico, and Russia (upper-middle); 
and France, Japan, and the United States (highest). In Panel B, the first row is an unweighted average across selected 
countries. In other rows, average prices and costs are weighted by utility customers for the three largest utilities within 
selected countries, and unweighted across selected countries. The individual country sources include government statistics 
websites and specific utilities’ websites.
Panel B: Pricing in Selected Countries
Panel A: World Electricity Overview
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For the poorest quartile of countries, an implication of losing money on electricity supply 
is that expanding access will increase losses.  To test this idea, we consider the evolution across 
countries of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, as a proxy for power theft. T&D loss is 
the share of power generated that goes unbilled (as opposed to commercial losses, which are power 
billed, but not paid for). A small amount of power (around 5 to 10%) is lost for unavoidable 
technical reasons (line losses). Losses much above this level come from hooking onto distribution 
wires, unmetered power, meter tampering, or other forms of theft. To understand how T&D losses 
vary with electricity access, we plot T&D losses against percent access to electricity (the share of 
the population with a grid connection) from 1990-2014 for all countries with available data, and 
fit a nonparametric regression. Data from 142 countries are included with 125 of these countries 
having non-missing data in all 25 years.  
Figure 3 plots the result, an inverse-U shape where losses rise and then fall in access. For 
countries in years where access is very low, T&D losses are high, but losses actually increase 
further as access expands before falling again as access approaches 100%. This means that 
countries which are trying to expand distribution (for example, into the countryside) face the 
highest rates of nonpayment for electricity.  At the peak of the curve, countries with about 40% 
access to electricity lose 25% of their power before it is billed to any consumer.1 T&D losses have 
an economic interpretation, not just a technical one. A 33% T&D loss rate implies the utility is 
giving away 1 in 3 units of electricity for free – in other words, the effective cost per kWh sold 
increases by 50%. Many states in Nigeria and India, among other places, exhibit T&D losses at 
least this high (UDAY 2019, NERC 2019).  The fact that each new consumer adds a loss serves 
as a disincentive to expand access. Losses decline as repayment norms are established and enforced 
for richer countries at higher levels of access.  
We call the inverse-U relationship in Figure 3 an electricity Kuznets curve. Much like the 
original Kuznets curve that documents an increase and subsequent decrease in inequality as a 
function of income, distribution companies see losses initially increase as we move up from low 
levels of access and then decline as access becomes more widespread. Because electricity 
distribution is loss-making, initial efforts by the government to reach more of the population lead 
to higher losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Assuming technical losses make up 5% of the total, at least 20% of electricity is lost to consumers hooking into 
power lines, tampering with meters, or otherwise using power before a bill can be issued to someone. 
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Figure 3 
Access to Electricity and Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Losses   
 
Source: World Bank 
Notes: Each point represents one country and year, for all 142 countries and years from 1990-2014 for which data are available. 
The local linear regression and histogram of access to electricity are both weighted by country population. T&D losses are 
defined as the percent of electricity generated by all power sources (in kWh) that is not billed to any consumer. Access data was 
originally gathered from household surveys and T&D data are originally from national energy agencies. 
 
 
II. A Model to Explain Rationing 
 
In this section we examine the mechanism by which the treatment of electricity as a right and its 
non-excludability causes utilities to ration supply (see Figure 4). Consider the case of two types of 
consumers, H (the rich) and L (the poor). The demand curve of the H type is labeled H. The demand 
curve for the L type is denoted by LPMWTP, which reflects their private marginal willingness to pay. 
The treatment of electricity as a right means that society values each unit of consumption by the 
poor above their own willingness to pay, which could be for a variety of reasons, including because 
the state finds it dignified that the poor have light in their homes, or due to market failures like 
credit constraints that limit the poor’s ability to pay their full private valuation. This is reflected 
by  LSWTP, which represents societal willingness-to-pay of L consumers, lying above LPMWTP. 
Indeed, the idea that social WTP is above private WTP—i.e., ability to pay—is a motivation for 
why public provision exists in the first place (Banerjee 1997).  
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At marginal cost MC the efficient quantities of consumption are AL and AH. If the state set 
price this high, L consumers would only consume at AL2, generating a deadweight loss, relative to 
the social optimum that is determined by LSWTP.; this deadweight loss is denoted by the grey 
triangle in the figure and labeled as L surplus lost. Marginal cost pricing fails to deliver the social 
optimum here, because society places a value on L consumers consumption that is over and above 
their own valuation. The state therefore sets a lower price, Plisted, which is below marginal cost to 
encourage additional consumption. At this price, the L types, whose consumption is valued by the 
state, would increase consumption to BL, listed. The state would lose (MC – Plisted ) BL, listed in 
subsidies but the poor consume closer to the efficient quantity. 
But subsidies are not only explicit. The combination of the social norm that electricity is a 
right and the costs of making electricity excludable limit the ability of the state to collect revenue. 
The effective price that consumers face is therefore much lower, at PEffective, and the poor consume 
BL at this lower price. The state makes a larger loss of (MC - PEffective ) BL, but the poor consume 
even closer to the efficient quantity (i.e., BL is closer to AL than BL, listed).  
Now if this price were applied to both types, rich consumers would use “too much” and 
consume at point BH. The loss associated with serving these consumers is larger than the loss from 
serving L types because the H types are richer and consume so much more. Furthermore, the state 
does not value the excess of their consumption over the efficient level and would makes enormous 
losses of (MC - PEffective ) BH on their supply. 
One solution to this problem might be to use block-rate tariffs in which case rich and poor 
consumers do not face the same marginal price. The trouble is that the high costs of making 
electricity excludable, combined with widespread non-payment inevitably arising from the social 
norm, mean that in practice, the state is not able to price discriminate between H and L types. 
Therefore, the effective price is indeed low for everyone; we provide some empirical evidence for 
this assumption in Figure 6 where we show that non-payment rates are independent of 
consumption levels.   
The state is therefore under severe budgetary pressure but has another instrument at its 
disposal - quantity rationing. One option is to limit supply to H types to the efficient level of AH.  
However, at this level the state will still make large losses, and may not value the surplus of the H 
types at all. Furthermore, in a world there are many consumer types, the effective price may be 
very low, and the state is limited by its budget constraint. There is no reason to think utilities will 
be solvent with only the small degree of rationing to AH.  
Thus, in order to keep enough funds to continue supplying all the types together, the state 
may ration further to a point like q". At q", L type consumers are not much affected. They still use 
a quantity close to their efficient quantity and would not want to pay much higher prices for the 
small gain in gross surplus that pricing at cost would bring them. But H consumers have been cut 
back sharply to BHr. These consumers are using less than the efficient level of power; the well-off 
farmer will not have a refrigerator, for example, or a rural metal shop will continue to use only 
hand tools.  
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Despite the fact that the H types are paying low prices, their loss of surplus may be great 
enough that they would prefer a regime with full supply and prices raised to cover costs. The H 
consumer has gained the dotted area in the figure labeled “H surplus gained,” since power is so 
cheap. However, the H consumer has lost the shaded triangle, “H surplus lost,” which would have 
been part of his consumer surplus with marginal cost pricing and no rationing, due to the restriction 
of power supply. The lost surplus from rationing may well outweigh the gain from high prices; the 
sign of this trade-off is ambiguous. What is clear is that, due to rationing, the marginal unit of 
electricity for these consumers is valued far above the unit cost that they pay. Yet despite this, H 
consumers cannot buy more electricity.  
 
Figure 4 
A Mechanism for Electricity Rationing 
 
 
III. The Consequences of Treating Electricity as a Right 
 
This section uses empirical data to walk through the different steps that begin with treating 
electricity as a right, and end with crippling electricity rationing. The facts that we will document 
are (i) energy is viewed as a right, (ii) this results in subsidies, theft, and distribution companies 
losing money, (iii) which leads to the rationing of supply and (iv) the delinking of supply from 
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payment. All these four factors erode payment incentives for private consumers, reinforcing the 
viewpoint we started with, namely that electricity is a right and not a private good.  
 
A. Step 1: Electricity is seen as a right  
 
Table 2 documents a set of beliefs that people hold about electricity, using survey data 
from Bihar. The vast majority of customers, both rich and poor, expect no penalty from paying a 
bill late, or illegally hooking into the grid, or wiring around a meter, or even bribing electricity 
officials to avoid payment. These attitudes are common across much of the developing world and 
stand in stark contrast to how the same consumers view payment for private goods like cell phones. 
We could debate whether cellphones are more important than electricity but, in Bihar we find that 
the poor spend three times more on cell phones than they do on electricity (1.7% versus 0.6% of 
total expenditure). These small expenditure shares suggest that is not the inability to pay but rather 
the norm of non-payment that is coming in the way of people paying for the electricity they use.   
 
Table 2 
Customer Beliefs about Enforcement in Bihar, India 
 
Source: Bihar Electrification Project endline household survey 
Notes: Responses are from a survey of 7.071 households in rural Bihar. Modifying a meter, having an informal hooked 
connection, and bribing officials all prevent a utility from observing actual electricity consumed, and therefore constitute power 
theft. 
 
A second piece of evidence showing how electricity is viewed as a right comes from how 
poor countries set electricity prices.  Figure 5 plots the published marginal price of each kilowatt-
hour (kWh) of electricity, averaged across countries within a World Bank income group. The 
vertical lines in the figure indicate the average level of consumption for consumers in each income 
quartile. 
Utilities everywhere charge less for consumers who use small amounts of power. The price 
of power on the first step is low and then steps up for greater consumption. Across our sample of 
30 utilities in 16 countries, almost every utility charges less for the first few kWh then for 
remaining units. Since the marginal cost of power does not change with an individual’s 
consumption, the most likely explanation for increasing block pricing is distributional 
considerations. The first step of such tariffs are sometimes explicitly called “lifeline” tariffs. 
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While marginal prices increase with consumption in both low income and high income 
countries, the difference is much greater in low income countries (a factor of 3.9 rather than a 
factor of 1.5 in high income countries). Moreover, because poor consumers use less, many more 
people are consuming power at the highly subsidized initial rates. Even at higher energy 
consumption levels, tariff rates in low income countries tend to be much lower than in rich 
countries. It may be that fixed costs of distribution are also lower in poor countries, but this does 
not seem to be the main story, as the highest tariff steps are still below the cost of power purchase 
alone (Table 1). The pricing of power below cost means that distributional companies are set to 
lose money even if consumers paid all their bills. This is the first step down into insolvency shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 5 
Explicit Subsidies in the Marginal Price of Power 
 
Source: Electricity tariff (rate) schedules published by selected utilities 
Notes: The graph shows the published marginal price of an additional kWh of power for selected countries within a 2018 World 
Bank income group. In general, the cheapest available domestic/household rate is used. Selected countries are in the union of the 
three largest countries by population in each income group and the ten largest countries worldwide. We construct each country’s 
price schedule separately and compute unweighted average prices at each kWh level. For countries with multiple rate schedules, 
we use the three largest utilities by number of customers (five for India) and take a weighted average by customer count to 
construct the country schedule. Utilities sometimes adjust fixed charges or the marginal price on previous units when a 
consumption threshold is exceeded; those one-time increases in the marginal price are not included. 
 
Theft and non-payment represent the next two steps down into insolvency (Figure 1). We 
have shown that T&D losses are higher in poor countries, but there is not comparable data breaking 
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down power theft and non-payment across a range of countries. From our data on Bihar, however, 
we can look more carefully at how power is lost and who does not pay for it. 
 We showed earlier that overall rates of collection are astonishingly low (Figure 2). Low 
collection could be due to outright theft, beyond the utility’s control, or due to commercial losses 
and non-payment. Here we show that a surprisingly large part of losses stem from known, formal 
customers not paying their bills.  
 Figure 6 utilizes administrative billing data from Bihar and plots the collection rate against 
monthly electricity consumed, averaged across each month in 2018 for the subset of households 
that actually receive bills. The mean collection rate for billed consumers in Bihar is 42%, as it was 
for our fictional ice cream store.  Moreover, the collection rate conditional on consumption (dashed 
line) is roughly flat across the consumption distribution, or even slightly declining, implying that 
bigger consumers are just as delinquent on their electricity bills as smaller ones. More than half of 
collection losses are due to nonpayment by consumers using over 100 kWh per month (one minus 
the dotted line), though the histogram shows that they are a small subset of domestic consumers in 
Bihar.  
  
Figure 6 
Cost Recovery and Bill Payment in Bihar 
 
Source: Bihar Electrification Project 
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Notes: The graph shows average collection rates by kWh consumption level, as well as the share of collection losses accounted 
for by consumers below that level. Only consumers who are actually billed are included. The collection rate equals revenue 
received as a share of the billed amount, and therefore does not account for outright power theft. Consumption brackets are 0-
0.25 log10 kWh, 0.25-0.50 log10 kWh, etc. Customers with monthly household consumption above 100 kWh account for half of 
all collection losses. 
 
These findings support our assumption that low effective prices are not confined to the poor. If 
electricity as a right were confined to the poor we would expect to observe substantially higher 
collection rates on bills issued to the biggest consumers, with most losses due to nonpayment by 
small-time customers. The finding that non-payment conditional on being a formal customer and 
receiving a bill is both high and constant across the distribution of consumption suggests that de 
facto low effective prices are an accepted and agreed upon policy of the state. These are customers 
that are administratively known to the utility, visible in their data, who are not paying and yet who 
remain connected customers, piling up debt month after month.  
 
B. Step 2: Electricity distribution is loss-making 
 
Thanks to large subsidies, theft and nonpayment, utilities in poor countries lose a lot of money. 
For Bihar, the revenue rate we computed earlier is essentially an all-in measure of losses. The 
mean revenue rate in Bihar is 30%. In other words, across a state of 100 million people, the electric 
utilities can only manage to recover revenues equivalent to one-third of the cost of power. Almost 
two-thirds of the costs are covered through per-unit government subsidies, government bailouts, 
and running up debt. Utilities across the developing world similarly earn less per unit of power 
sold, even ignoring losses from theft and non-payment. Our analysis of Table 1 showed that 
utilities in countries in the bottom half of the world income distribution make negative profits per 
unit. 
The problem with a power sector reliant on debt and subsidies is that the commitment to 
power subsidies, while large, is bounded. Eventually utilities run out of other people’s money. A 
number of countries have run up substantial power sector debt and in some cases it has been large 
enough to have macroeconomic implications. Accumulated electricity debt in Pakistan counts for 
almost 4% of GDP (Babar 2018). India was facing stressed power debts of $62.5 billion in mid-
2018, amounting to 2.4% of GDP (FTE 2018). These debts, including $30 billion of loans directly 
to distribution companies, threatened to instigate a financial crisis. Underscoring the speed at 
which power debt can accumulate, it should be noted that India’s current distribution company 
debts exist in spite of a USD 42 billion central government bailout in 2016 and 2017 to save states 
from insolvency, which followed earlier bailouts in 2011 and 2002 (Business Today India 2018). 
There is thus a roughly 7-10 year epicycle of power sector bailouts in India. At the peak of the 
Puerto Rico debt crisis in the United States, the state-run power utility owed $9 billion in debt, in 
part because it gave free power for years to government-owned agencies and businesses (Walsh 
2016). Power sector debt in Nigeria has also been reported to scare off private investments in 
generation and in Ghana leads to power rationing (Akwagyriram and Carsten 2018; “Power 
rationing imminent” 2018). 
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C. Step 3: Distribution companies ration supply 
  
Utility debts matter because they lead us to the defining characteristic of electricity in poor 
countries: rationing. Losing money on each unit sold, and unable to simply shut down, due to their 
public mandate, the only option left for utilities is to sell less by purposefully restricting supply. 
This is given fancy names, like load shedding, but at its core it is a company choosing to sell less 
of its product even though there are customers willing to pay more than the cost of supply. In 
practice quantity is rationed by restricting the hours of supply on the grid (Figure 2). In Bihar, this 
literally means that there is a man at each electricity feeder who switches the power grid off and 
on with a large switch. (We will return to his decision-making later.) 
 India is the largest country by population that still faces electricity rationing. Figure 7 gives 
the distribution of daily hours of supply across the country. In rural areas the median household 
receives under 10 hours of electricity per day. Urban areas receive over 19 hours. But only a small 
proportion of the population enjoys 24-hour electricity.  
 Rationing is not due to any absolute scarcity. In 2012, the year the data for Figure 7 was 
collected, coal plant utilization in India was under 70%, and in 2018 it is 55%. From the point of 
view of Bihar, which uses a small share of India’s power and is connected to a national grid, an 
essentially perfectly elastic supply of power is available at a reasonable cost on wholesale power 
markets. India has the capacity to keep the lights on, but power utilities do not have the incentive 
to do so.  
Power rationing parallels Sen’s (1982) analysis of famine. He argues that during the Great 
Bengal famine of 1943 there was not any shortage of food in the aggregate sense, but rather in the 
famine affected individuals were not capable to buy the food they wanted. Similarly, the allocation 
of power is broken, and like the H types, many people cannot buy the power they want. The same 
is true of places like Pakistan, which is now backing down Chinese-funded coal plants and 
Ethiopia, which benefits from abundant hydropower resources. 
 Developing countries do also experience physical shortages of power and blackouts due to 
exogenous technical shocks, like the over-heating of a transmission line. These shortages are best 
thought of as rationing in the long run. Shortages are ultimately the result of mispricing and losses 
in electricity distribution, when a lack of revenue flowing into the sector undercuts investment in 
generation and transmission. Ghana’s most recent power crisis provides an example of this type 
(Kumi 2017). McRae (2015) shows how utilities serving a population of poor (L type) consumers 
may provide low quality supply if consumers are unwilling to pay for power but the utility is 
subsidized for its losses in serving them at average cost. The utility provides better quality to richer 
consumers who do pay their bills. The social norm of electricity being a right breaks down this 
distinction, since both types choose to steal power, and consequently supply is rationed 
everywhere.  
 
 
Figure 7 
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Cumulative Distribution Function of Hours of Power Supply in India 
 
Source: IHDS 2011-12 
Notes: This figure shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of the hours of electricity supply reported by 
rural (red), urban (green), and all (blue) households in the India Human Development Survey, 2011-12. Households 
reporting no electricity have been considered to receive zero hours of daily supply. At each point in the distribution, 
rural households have fewer hours of electricity than urban households. The median urban household receives over 
19 hours of electricity per day, while the median rural household receives under 10 hours of electricity per day. 
 
D. Step 4: Supply and payment become delinked 
 
Though payment is below cost it is not so far below everywhere (Figure 2). So, in principle, a 
utility could respect its budget constraint by rationing judiciously, giving 24 hours of electricity to 
areas that pay, and less to those that do not. Or, it may give more power to areas that have a higher 
value, for example because they include more businesses or public facilities like hospitals. At a 
higher level of aggregation electricity is perfectly excludable.  
But the right to electricity is a social concept, not a technical one. Even if a utility is 
physically able to cut off a group of delinquent customers, the right of all citizens to electricity 
may render it unwilling to do so. So in Figure 2 rationing of power bears no relation to the payment 
rates of different areas. In continuing to keep the lights on for nonpayers, the utility reveals it is 
unwilling to act like a profit-maximizing business.  
Figure 8 
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Non-Market Influences on Supply 
 
 
Source: Bihar Electrification Project 
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of feeders in the Revenue-Linked Supply Scheme in Bihar that are non-
compliant with their supply schedule within the week for each week from November 2016 to March 2018. A feeder 
can be non-compliant for multiple reasons within the same week. There were 454 feeders in all weeks throughout 
Bihar that were used in the creation of this figure.  
 
A narrow interpretation is that utilities do not take this approach because of a technical 
limitation, that they cannot ration finely enough. Each point in Figure 2 represents a feeder, which 
serves a community, not individual people. Thus even if supply were linked to feeder-level 
payment, customers end up being accountable for the power theft of their neighbors. Economic 
rationing may therefore be unfair. It may also be ineffective, due to the public goods nature of 
payments, since people are probably willing to pay very little to light up their neighbors’ homes. 
If the utility were able to selectively and inexpensively cut-off individual consumers, perhaps it 
would do so.  
A broader interpretation is that under the social norm that energy is a right the allocation 
of power is no longer done on economic grounds, just as the pricing of power is not. The right to 
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electricity affects not just payment but allocation. If citizens engage in protests regarding 
electricity received, or equivalently if politicians promise to deliver more power in exchange for 
votes, the right to electricity can feed directly into utility supply decisions through politics.  
 In Figure 8 we try to deconstruct the reasons for power allocation using administrative data 
from Bihar. Every feeder has a schedule of supply, and we collect daily data on the reasons for 
deviations from the schedules over the course of 1.5 years. There are exogenous technical shocks 
due to outages (black) and weather (red), plotted in the bottom two segments. However, most 
deviations from the schedule are political or bureaucratic in nature. The biggest spikes in deviation, 
when many areas get more power, are for widely celebrated public holidays, when senior officials 
pass down orders to liberalize rationing.2  
When the public agitates against rationing, at any time of year, more power might be given 
(green segment). The operators of feeders have a fair amount of discretion and deviate from power 
supply schedules at times (orange segment). The distinction between public pressure and operator 
discretion is not sharp. In collecting this data, we heard anecdotes from operators who were 
threatened or physically beaten over power supply decisions. The threat of such action may induce 
operators to change supply (orange) before public pressure is observed (green). Officials of the 
distribution company who themselves fall under the influence of their political masters can also 
give orders at other times that supply be increased or cut back. These observations join a growing 
literature that documents political influences on electricity supply (Mahadevan 2018; Asher and 
Novosad 2017; Baskaran, Min and Uppal 2015;  Shaukat 2018). 
When power is rationed on politics rather than payment, consumers have little incentive to 
pay for electricity. They quickly learn that the way to get more power for their communities is to 
appeal to the local electricity grid operator or elected representative. In other words, electricity as 
a right becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Consequently, the cycle we have described in Parts 1-4 
will repeat itself. 
Rationing leads to losses because people who value electricity at more than its cost are 
unable to purchase it. The current system of allocation does not direct the rationed supplies of 
electricity to the customers who value it the most, but to those who demand it by force, or to 
those who are celebrating a holiday. As we have documented, political and other considerations 
come into play. The result is that there are surely substantial allocative inefficiencies, even after 
accounting for the difference between social willingness to pay and private willingness to pay. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
The consequence of the social norm that electricity is a right is that firms and people in developing 
countries cannot choose how much power to use. A whole range of consumption and production 
activities that could be taken up in a world with 24-hour electricity are foreclosed. A large array 
of potential firms cannot enter and existing firms cut output or rely on costly diesel generators 
                                               
2 In Pakistan, similarly, utilities declare that power cuts for non-payment will be strictly enforced during the month 
of Ramadan – except at mealtimes that precede and follow the daytime fast. 
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(Allcott et al., 2016). Households, rationed off the grid altogether, substitute to costly alternatives 
like diesel and off-grid solar power and are unable to make use of a whole range of utility 
enhancing appliances (Burgess et al., 2019). We never observe the latent demand that firms and 
people have for continuous, reliable electricity, because it is never offered. 
 What is the way out? We offer a taxonomy of reform in four areas: explicit subsidy reform, 
changing social norms, better technology, and privatization. Many of these policies are 
complements. They often focus narrowly on creating incentives for payment and collection, but 
they all share a longer-run goal of changing the way people think about electricity—that is, their 
aim is to break the social norm that electricity is a right.  
The first category of reform is to reduce explicit subsidies for electricity in size and in 
scope. This involves separating the objective of supplying electricity at full cost from the 
redistributive function of government. These two functions have often become intertwined in 
current electricity policy in developing countries, leading to the perception that electricity is a right 
for all. This is especially so because subsidies on electricity are often enjoyed by consumers across 
the income distribution, which both makes them regressive and furthers the notion that power is 
an entitlement. 
One way out is to remove subsidies from the tariff schedule charged by distribution 
companies. Instead, it would be much more effective to use transfer programs to provide any 
assistance deemed necessary for poorer consumers. Subsidies could be bundled into a system of 
unconditional direct benefit transfers which are targeted at the poorest members of society. If 
needed for the transition, a well-defined category of poor consumers may receive a “tagged” 
subsidy payment equal to the subsidies they would have received under current tariff schedules 
(see Figure 5). Indonesia moved away from energy subsidies towards direct transfers, though its 
policy has wavered lately (Burke and Kurniawati 2018). 
The second category of reforms aims to reduce theft and nonpayment of bills and in the 
process cause people to consider electricity a private good, much like cell phones. Relinking 
payment performance with supply is key to these efforts. In Bihar we engaged in a large-scale 
experiment involving twenty eight million consumers with the government to enact such a scheme. 
Under this initiative, the hours of electricity provided by the utility to a feeder were explicitly 
linked to bill collection rates via a transparent and heavily publicized schedule. This policy targets 
utility supply. Preliminary results suggest that linking leads to a simultaneous increase in revenue 
and energy supply. However, losses remain high, since we can target payment by groups of 13,000 
people but not individual customers. A similar initiative is underway nationally in Pakistan, 
allowing utilities there to cut off the most egregious offenders. Critical to these efforts is to 
communicate the benefits of paying for electricity. In Bihar where bill inserts, posters, sms 
messages and public announcements were used to relay how communities paying more would 
result in longer hours of electricity. Similarly, in Sao Paulo utilities held meetings with de facto 
leaders of slums before introducing billing, and in Delhi one utility hired 800 women from informal 
settlements to act as community liaisons (Lawaetz 2018). 
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A related set of reforms tries to break down the agency problems that have developed under 
the right to electricity by incentivizing the personnel that collect electricity payments to increase 
their collections. In theory, these high-performance incentives both elicit greater collection effort 
and break collusion between the bill collector and consumer of electricity, whereby bribes are paid 
in order to avoid having to pay for electricity. We are involved in evaluating an experimentally 
assigned scheme where utility employees in Bihar move from flat payments to one where they also 
retain a proportion of revenue from bills collected.  
Leveraging the identities of bill collectors and other utility employees may also improve 
bill collection. Rural electrification in the United States was achieved largely through rural 
electrification cooperatives (RECs), which were groups of farmers that maintained the grid and 
collected bills (Lewis and Severnini 2015; Kitchens and Fishback 2015). Bill collection may 
therefore be aided by social trust – when the collectors are your neighbors it is harder to ignore 
them. The history of electrification in China also involved local engagement with the electricity 
sector. Initial electrification was mainly funded by communities rather than the national 
government, and in some cases farmers were hired part-time as bill collectors (Aklin et al. 2018; 
Niez 2010). Rural communities were eventually connected to the national grid in the 2000s but 
reported electricity losses remained low, perhaps because of early local buy-in (Bhattacharya and 
Ohaire 2012).  
A third category of reform relies on the goddess of technology to make electricity 
excludable therefore making it possible to explicitly link payments and supply at the individual 
level. Smart meters can require payments in advance or allow the utility to cut off household 
electricity supply remotely, thus rationing individual households rather than whole towns and 
villages. Smart meters have been shown to reduce power consumption in some contexts (Jack and 
Smith 2015). That said, there remains a need for more evidence from high-theft environments, 
because even the best meter does nothing if a consumer connects themselves directly to the line 
on the street or is ‘allowed’ to wire around a meter. Work in healthcare shows that better 
monitoring can be undercut by bureaucratic collusion (Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster 2008). 
This policy agenda may seem incremental relative to the scale of the problem we have 
described. Why not directly leap to the goal, and privatize distribution in the hope that this leads 
to a market for electricity that looks more like the cellphone market? Indeed, it is natural to 
consider privatization as a fourth reform category. 
While appealing in theory, the political economy of electricity distribution makes the leap 
to privatization in many developing country contexts nearly impossible. Since the right to 
electricity is a social norm, sanctioned by the state, accepted by all parties, and coordinated by 
politicians and the public, the state must lead reform to break the right before privatization is 
feasible (Reddy and Sumithra 1997). The case of Odisha, a poor state neighboring Bihar, is 
illustrative. The state distribution companies were among the earliest in India to be restructured 
and privatized but have continued to have some of the highest loss rates in the country for two 
decades (as high as 34% as of 2018) and require continued subsidization (PowerLine 2018). 
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By contrast, in areas where there is enough public support, privatization might improve 
efficiency. For example, Delhi privatized distribution in 2002 and has seen incredibly rapid 
reductions in losses and improvements of supply, partly through the social engagement and 
technical reforms recommended above. Even so, power prices have remained a political hot button. 
In 2015 the Delhi Government reintroduced a significant 50% power subsidy for all consumers 
who use less than 400 kWh per month (Tongia 2017). The high threshold means over 80% of 
households in the city receive the subsidy. Beyond the large direct costs of this policy, it remains 
to be seen whether such policy might reintroduce the norm of electricity being a right and affect 
payment behavior more broadly, including among the middle and upper classes to whom the 
subsidy sometimes applies. This type of anecdote underscores the fragility of a high payment 
equilibria in a world where electricity is still broadly seen as an entitlement.  
To zoom back out from particular reforms, we conclude with the observation that whilst 
24/7/365 electricity holds immense potential it remains out of reach for the majority of developing 
countries. Macro solutions, like privatization or construction of ever more wires and plants, come 
into and out of favor, but we believe they are targeting the symptoms, not the cause. In our view, 
the only reliable solution is to eliminate the seemingly socially desirable, but ultimately pernicious, 
social norm that electricity is a right. 
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